



1 Numerical uncertainty identification, classification and quantification 2 in radioactive waste management

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6 **Abstract.** The work package “Uncertainty Management multi-Actor Network – UMAN” within EURAD European Joint
7 Programme on Radioactive Waste Management was dedicated to the management of uncertainties potentially relevant to the
8 safety of different radioactive waste management stages and programs. One important goal there was to compile, review,
9 compare and refine strategies, approaches and tools for the management of uncertainties in the safety analysis and the safety
10 case that are being used, planned to be used or being developed in different countries. This paper presents major findings from
11 the UMAN deliverable D10.3 “Uncertainty identification, classification and quantification” that addresses approaches to
12 identify and classify uncertainties that might be of relevance in the various stages of radioactive waste management as well as
13 on the quantification of numerical uncertainties. The section on methodology compares Bottom-up and Top-down strategies,
14 describes which sources were used for the report as input: expert elicitation (here primarily based on a respective questionnaire
15 send out to UMAN participants) and literature survey. It then advises on how uncertainties can be structured to pave the way
16 to a comprehensive assessment of numerical uncertainties: fishbone diagrams and tables for uncertainty characteristics. Results
17 support the identification of uncertainties with high relevance for RWM. Nine suitable categories are identified; the
18 uncertainties are then grouped (including representative examples utilizing fishbone diagrams and tables) according to the
19 occurrence by system phenomena, following the themes and subthemes of the EURAD Roadmap. The last part is treating with
20 the evaluation as well as quantification of uncertainties. The paper closes with recommendations aimed at future research
21 directions for parameter uncertainties. Finally, it provides definitions for some terms frequently used (uncertainty in general,
22 parameter uncertainty, uncertainty models, and aleatory vs. epistemic uncertainties) in a glossary.

23 1. Introduction

24 Deep geological repositories (DGR) are widely recognized as the safest method of isolating waste from the biosphere over
25 geological time scales. The management of potentially relevant uncertainties within the different stages and programs of
26 radioactive waste management is an essential part of the overall safety assessments. Therefore, the large EURAD European
27 Joint Programme on Radioactive Waste Management integrated a specific strategic study work package “Uncertainty
28 Management multi-Actor Network – UMAN”. One important goal there was to compile, review, compare and refine strategies,
29 approaches and tools for the management of uncertainties in the safety analysis and the safety case that are being used, planned



30 to be used or being developed in different countries. A respective deliverable D10.3 "Uncertainty identification, classification
31 and quantification" addresses approaches to identify and classify uncertainties that might be of relevance in the various stages
32 of radioactive waste management (RWM) as well as on the quantification of numerical uncertainties. This paper is based on
33 that report, and it summarizes its main findings. The report was prepared within the UMAN Subtask 2.2 and its questionnaire
34 "Uncertainty identification, classification and quantification". The authors were supported by various European partners:
35 CIEMAT, EIMV, GRS, HZDR, Nagra, NDA, SCK-CEN, STUBA, SURAO, and TU Sofia.

36 The section on methodology compares Bottom-up and Top-down strategies, and it describes which sources were used for the
37 report as input: expert elicitation (here primarily based on a respective questionnaire send out to UMAN participants) and
38 literature survey. It then provides advice on how to structure uncertainties to pave the way for a comprehensive assessment of
39 numerical uncertainties: fishbone diagrams and tables of uncertainty characteristics. The results support the identification of
40 uncertainties with high relevance for RWM. Nine suitable categories are identified; the uncertainties are then grouped
41 (including representative examples using fishbone diagrams and tables) according to their occurrence by system phenomena,
42 following the themes and subthemes of the EURAD Roadmap. The last part deals with the assessment and quantification of
43 uncertainties. The paper concludes with recommendations for future research directions on parameter uncertainties. Finally, a
44 glossary provides definitions for some frequently used terms (uncertainty in general, parameter uncertainty, uncertainty
45 models, and aleatory vs. epistemic uncertainty).

46 It should be emphasized, that this paper deals exclusively with numerical uncertainties. When applying the distinction between
47 parameter, model and scenarios uncertainties (see IAEA ISAM reports, e.g. IAEA, 2004), the focus is clearly set on
48 uncertainties related to numerical parameters. These can originate from a wide range of impacting factors, reaching from
49 physico-chemical data, site characteristics, geological situations to construction details to name but a few. Thus, this paper
50 addresses uncertainties in numerical model parameters and other uncertainties that can be parameterized in a numerical or
51 quasi-numerical way. It does not cover model uncertainties related to doubts about the correct model selection or missing
52 information about the presence or absence of model components.

53 As an example, the set of chemical species considered in specific scenarios in Thermo-Hydraulic-Mechanic-Chemical-
54 Biological (THMCB) models can differ significantly. In general, how to identify and prioritize specific uncertainties in
55 nonlinearly coupled THMCB processes in absence of experimental information is often a major challenge. Most experimental
56 information is available for specific coupled processes but not for all processes at the same time. Additionally, boundary
57 conditions in experiments are often kept constant for better understanding and modelling, but they are evolving and changing
58 over time for a real repository system.

59 Another type of uncertainty not addressed in this report concerns the effects of numerical dispersion, mostly due to the limited
60 precision of computer-internal data handling / algorithms. This also applies to numerical model processing strategies that



61 contain implicit formulations to be solved iteratively, where the chosen abort criteria will of course also introduce uncertainties.
 62 In safety cases, this is dealt with by requirements for model validation, qualification and verification.

63 Moreover, this deliverable explicitly excludes most of the scenario uncertainties, including, e.g., consequences of future state
 64 changes due to geological, climatic or extra-terrestrial effects. Uncertainty creates an uncomfortable position for a large part
 65 of the public (anxiety). Thus, a well-documented treatment of uncertainties is not only an essential part of RWM strategies but
 66 it is also of paramount importance in any socio-cultural and political discussions with public stakeholders and non-
 67 governmental organizations (NGOs).

68 Decisions associated with RWM programs are made in the presence of irreducible and reducible uncertainties. Although
 69 reduction is possible in principle, it may be hampered by a lack of time, money, experimental resources, access to sites, hard-
 70 to-mimic boundary conditions and other obstacles.

71 Uncertainties are a major challenge, as shown in Table. 1 below. Whereas the “Known knows” are a “safe” region, the
 72 “Unknown knows” point to knowledge that exists but has not been tapped so far (as it may stem from scientific areas only
 73 loosely connected to RWM, or it is not well documented / accessible). In contrast, the “Known unknowns” indicate critical
 74 knowledge that the community is already aware of but cannot yet describe / explain / model it (including the associated
 75 uncertainties). Finally, the “Unknown unknowns” are the most difficult part as they are not yet in the focus of consideration at
 76 all, they are unidentified risks. Other challenges include the difficulty of expressing uncertainties numerically and the broad
 77 variety of mathematical approaches to treat them - uncertainties are often scenario-dependent, and they usually have a high
 78 degree of dimensionality. Both boundary conditions may render uncertainty and sensitivity analyses a computationally very
 79 expensive task.

80 **Table1: Categories of uncertainties**

Certainty		Certain (Known)	Uncertain (Unknown)	
			Impact	Occurrence
Identification		Known known (identified knowledge)	Known unknown (identified risk)	
Unidentified (Unknown)	Consequence		Unknown known (untapped knowledge)	Unknown unknown (unidentified risk)
	Event			



81 2. Methodology

82 RWM and the related safety cases are very complex issues that cut across several scientific disciplines. This leads to multiple,
83 divergent understandings and definitions of certain technical terms. Therefore, this section begins with definitions of the most
84 important terms used in this report. The definitions aim to provide a common formulation of terms for all subsequent
85 discussions related to uncertainties.

86 Uncertainty

87 The definition and meaning of the term ‘uncertainty’ depends on the field of science and on the context in which it is used.
88 Here, ‘uncertainty’ is understood as a total or partial lack of objective information (evidence) or subjective information
89 (knowledge) (Nagra, 2019) and is used to express doubts about a result. This includes also doubts about the validity of concepts,
90 methods, measurements and values.

91 Numerical Parameter Uncertainty

92 Numerical parameter uncertainty – or numerical uncertainty for short – is defined as the uncertainty of a value associated with
93 the result of a measurement or any other data value. It characterizes the range that could reasonably be assigned to the value.
94 This follows the definition given in the GUM guide (International Organization for Standardization, 2008) for so called
95 ‘measurement uncertainty’. Please note, that the definition is not limited to the measurement in *stricto sensu*, i.e. the ‘analytical
96 uncertainty’, but includes all uncertainty sources that arise in the generation of data, for example also lack of knowledge or the
97 random nature of the parameter value.

98 Uncertainty model

99 Each specific numerical parameter uncertainty may have multiple sources of uncertainty, e.g., through uncertainties propagated
100 from submodels or originating from direct (experimental) measurement procedures often involving several steps (Ellison &
101 Williams, 2012). The term “uncertainty model” is used in this document to approximate the total estimated uncertainty of a
102 parameter by linking all uncertainty components from all sources and their mutual relationships as good as possible. In other
103 words, the true numerical uncertainty sources are mapped into components of an uncertainty model. Uncertainty models then
104 can be used to derive pdfs or to feed other approaches such as fuzzy sets.

105 Aleatory vs. epistemic uncertainties


106 Uncertainties can be epistemic or aleatory. In this document, the usage of these two terms follows the description in the GRS
107 report 412 (Spiessl and Becker, 2017) and Nagra (Nagra, 2019):

- 108 • Epistemic uncertainty: refers to the uncertainty about the numerical model used that results from limited knowledge of
109 the natural conditions and processes, e.g. uncertainty about missing parameters or characteristics of parameters in
110 numerical models. In principle, it can be reduced by performing appropriate research (e.g. moving to more suitable
111 measuring devices and methodologies, or simply by increasing the number of experiments to obtain better statistics)
112 and by obtaining more information about the natural systems.



113 • Aleatory uncertainty: refers to the uncertainty that is stochastic for the parameter in a numerical model. Because the
114 model parameters are chosen according to the current understanding of the underlying processes, the reported variability
115 in parameter values is often due only to random processes. This type of uncertainty is an intrinsic property of the
116 parameter in numerical models and cannot be reduced.

117 The major components of a proposed methodology to treat numerical uncertainties are outlined in Fig. 1 below.



118
119 **Figure 1: Major elements of a methodology to treat numerical uncertainties**

120 2.1. Importance of processes and parameters

121 The initial steps of identifying those processes and parameters that are highly relevant to RWM are very important, as the sheer
122 number of uncertainties is overwhelming. Relevance can be inferred from:

- 123 • Level of impact on safety
- 124 • Level of impact on decision-making process
- 125 • Priority for further investigation
- 126 • Cost-benefit-ratio

127 However, such criteria appear to be used regularly but are rarely specified. Some guidance may come from Table 2.



128 **Table 2: Relevance of process derived from uncertainty and impact severity.**

		Uncertainty		
		Large Amount of Knowledge	Medium Amount of Knowledge	High Amount of Knowledge
Severity	Catastrophic Impact	Critical	Critical	Critical
	Medium Impact	Potential	Potential	Potential
	Low Impact	Non-Critical	Non-Critical	Potential

129 Another approach to assess the relevance of processes and their uncertainty is to consider Bottom-Up (BU) and Top-Down
 130 (TD) modelling strategies. They are used for a multitude of complex applications in science and society beyond RWM. It is
 131 advisable to have an understanding of both philosophies, their respective strengths and limitations.

132 **BU:** builds on detailed knowledge and process understanding at a mechanistic level, which fosters public acceptance of
 133 specific safety cases. However, it typically has an enormous amount of detail (over 200 parameters collected by the
 134 OECD/NEA Crystalline Club alone for assessing host rock properties in the safety case). BU models might be difficult
 135 to parameterize, and they may require a huge amount of computing time. On the other side, it allows many parameters
 136 to be declared insensitive already at an early stage of model development.

137 **TD:** focuses on the integration of system components. It can often handle large numbers of uncertain parameters more easily,
 138 but may overlook higher-order effects and may not cover all regions of interests.

139 Often, a combination of both approaches is beneficial, as BU can provide generic parameters requested by TD models, usually
 140 starting at a fairly coarse level and then being refined iteratively. For complex systems, a hierarchy of models (often to be
 141 refined iteratively) may be required. Depending on the specific application area within RWM, the mutual relationships between
 142 BU and TD and their respective weights may vary. BU models clearly scale with the dimensionality.

143 In the context of the assessment of uncertainties with respect to their potential treatment in numerical models, two survey
 144 methods were followed. In parallel to a literature survey (a selection of reference publications is given in the “bibliography”
 145 section) a questionnaire was developed. It was designed to ask for established knowledge on how to identify numerical
 146 uncertainties (i.e. uncertainties concerning quantities, sometimes also called parameter uncertainties) that might be relevant
 147 and which possible schemes of classification of uncertainties are used so far. Thus, it was a compilation from expert elicitation.
 148 It was developed together with partners from the UMAN Subtask 2.3 “Methodological approaches to uncertainty and



149 sensitivity analysis” to also cover questions of quantitative handling of numerical uncertainties in model calculations as
 150 required in performance assessment. Responses were received from the 14 organizations listed in Table 3. They included waste
 151 management organizations (WMO), technical support organizations (TSO) and research entities (RE), thus covering a wide
 152 range of expertise.

153 The questionnaire contained 18 questions in total and focused on the following issues:

- 154 • Which category of numerical uncertainties do you typically encounter in your work? Please label your answers whether
 155 they are aleatory or epistemic.
- 156 • Which rules / handbooks / best practices / ... are used in your work group to treat uncertainties?
- 157 • How do you identify the relevance of uncertainties?
- 158 • Which numerical parameters are in the focus of your experimental or modelling work, to which processes / phenomena
 159 are they related?
- 160 • Describe the types of uncertainties relevant for the example.
- 161 • By which means did you quantify these uncertainties?
- 162 • How do you parameterize the uncertainties?
- 163 • Which methods are used to verify post mortem a correct assignment of approach and parameterization?

164 **Table 3: EURAD participants having responded to the combined UMAN Subtasks 2.2/2.3 questionnaire in**
 165 **alphabetical order.**

Acronym	Full name of institution	Category	Country
ANDRA	Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs	WMO	France
CIEMAT	Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas	TSO	Spain
EIMV	Elektroinštitut Milan Vidmar	TSO	Slovenia
GRS	Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit	TSO	Germany
IRSN	Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire	TSO	France
NAGRA	Nationale Genossenschaft für die Lagerung radioaktiver Abfälle	WMO	Switzerland
RWM	Radioactive Waste Management	WMO	Great Britain
SCK CEN	Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie / Centre d'Étude de l'énergie Nucléaire	RE	Belgium
STUBA	Slovak University of Technology	RE	Slovakia
SÚRAO	Správa úložišť radioaktivních odpadů	WMO	Czech Republic
TUL	Technical University Liberec	RE	Czech Republic
TU Sofia	Technical University Sofia	RE	Bulgaria
UDC	Universidad de La Coruña	RE	Spain
UJV	ÚJV Řež, a.s.	RE	Czech Republic

166 The second input source for the report’s content is previously published documents about uncertainties, including contributions
 167 from the questionnaire:



- 168 • Peer-reviewed publications in journals,
- 169 • Textbooks about uncertainty,
- 170 • Reports from institutions, e.g. NAGRA, POSIVA, GRS, NDA,
- 171 • Deliverables and reports from previous projects (e.g. PAMINA, NEA MeSA Initiative),
- 172 • Deliverables, milestones and presentations from EURAD,
- 173 • FEP lists.

174 Textbooks provide a good overview and in-depth discussion of the uncertainty topics they cover. In particular, textbook
175 sections on RWM are well suited to contextualize the uncertainties of the specific scientific disciplines involved in RWM
176 safety cases. Peer-reviewed publications in journals, on the other hand, mainly discuss specialized topics of the uncertainty in
177 RWM, regularly related to only one discipline. For projects reports and institutional reports, the situation is two-fold: Reports
178 from national institutions and projects are often specific to certain techniques, regions, concepts, etc., similar to journal
179 publications. Nevertheless, these reports are an important source of uncertainty descriptions (e.g. Aaltonen et al., 2016, and
180 Posiva Oy, 2005). In addition to reports that compile specific expertise, there are often reports that provide a broad overview
181 of uncertainty sources (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2019) as well as reports that provide more detailed descriptions and concepts
182 of uncertainty sources and applied numerical models. The situation is different for transnational projects where often more
183 general considerations are addressed, for example in the final report of PAMINA (Galson & Richardson, 2009) and the report
184 of NEA MeSA Initiative (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2012). It should be mentioned that all the sources mentioned above include
185 a rich bibliography of secondary references, so that the interested person can easily make use of a large pool of information.
186 All sources identified and used in this report are listed in the References section.

187 **2.2. Types of characterizations for uncertainties and their underlying structures / relationships**

188 This section provides advice on how to structure, characterize and illustrate uncertainties to pave the way to a comprehensive
189 assessment of numerical uncertainties. When a Bottom-up approach is applied, the following specifics are to be taken into
190 consideration:

- 191 • Basic uncertainties may effect “very different processes very differently”
- 192 • Uncertainties may be different for alternative models (for the same process)
- 193 • There is a hierarchy of models, and up-scaling is a clear challenge. Model reduction is a potential solution, which may
194 also include machine learning applications.

195 Uncertainties identified within the UMAN work package activities include:

- 196 • Uncertainties related to material characteristics of the technical components used for the primary containment of the
197 repository system, i.e. the Engineered Barrier System (EBS), with containers, backfill, cementitious enforcements, seals
198 and plugs, etc.



- 199 • Uncertainties associated with characteristics and physical behaviour of the radioactive waste source, e.g. concentration,
200 composition, activity.
- 201 • Uncertainties related to experimental observation of intrinsic, i.e. independent of a specific site, physicochemical
202 properties. Examples would be thermodynamics and kinetics for subsystems of a disposal system.
- 203 • Uncertainties of the host rock characteristics, including the spatial variability at all scales of the geological host rock
204 formation. This involves analytical uncertainties and field observation errors.
- 205 • Uncertainties about future climate development, typical scenarios include glaciation or water transgression.
- 206 • Uncertainties caused by upscaling from laboratory scale, in time as well as in space. Typically, the maximum time span
207 accessible for laboratory observations (some decades) is very short in comparison to the very long periods to be assessed
208 within RWM, with the vast majority not exceeding the few years of a Ph.D. project. Consequently, upscaling is
209 necessary but difficult to implement. In general, the kinetics of most natural processes in the environment of a repository
210 are much slower than experimental boundary conditions would allow for. Similar restrictions apply to the experimental
211 accessibility of large-scale phenomena, though underground research laboratories at least offer scales of some dozens
212 of meters at maximum. Only natural and anthropogenic analogues allow drawing direct conclusions on even larger time
213 and space scales.
- 214 • Uncertainties related to the transposition of data acquired for one site to another site (or even another similar host rock).
- 215 Those uncertainties related to technical and geo-technical systems and, to a lesser extent, waste characterization, are generally
216 described very clearly. Another topic that has been well discussed is the uncertainty associated with physical and chemical
217 parameters (thermodynamics is invariant to location or disposal concept) that result from measuring systems on the lab scale,
218 e.g. sorption coefficients of a specific RN onto a well-defined crystalline structure. Uncertainties inherent to natural systems,
219 i.e. field data representative for a potential disposal site, are mentioned as being very important. However, they are rarely
220 discussed in detail (Bárdossy and Fodor, 2004). A critical aspect of these uncertainties to be considered is their spatial
221 distribution and the type of heterogeneities occurring. Another group of poorly described uncertainties is introduced by the
222 upscaling over many orders of magnitude in time and space when transferring from lab-scale (nm for molecular interactions)
223 to repository scale (hundreds of m in vertical and dozens of km in lateral distances).
- 224 The literature sources and experts describe the identified uncertainty sources at different levels of detail and complexity. In the
225 easiest case, uncertainty models have precisely defined boundaries. These include for example uncertainties of well-controlled
226 experiments with only few response variables, some properties of the radioactive waste itself or of several technical barrier
227 components. For these types of uncertainty sources, the majority of the literature sources and experts agree on uncertainty
228 models describing them. These models are typically highly detailed and the uncertainty components are often very specific to
229 uncertainty sources. One prominent example for such cases is the uncertainty treatment of thermodynamic data as promoted
230 by the OECD-NEA Thermochemical Database (NEA TDB). Each element-specific volume contains an appendix labelled
231 “Assigned uncertainties” which explains all details; see e.g. the most recent issue of a TDB volume (Grenthe et al., 2020).



232 For certain topics, uncertainty models comprise a broad spectrum of uncertainty sources. Also, it is not always apparent which
233 sources are finally included into the uncertainty models or how the uncertainty sources are “mapped” into components. An
234 illustrative example is sorption of RNs (see Fig. 2). The total estimated uncertainty of this process depends strongly on the
235 types of sources considered, reaching from natural variability of clay components (type, amount, or distribution), their grain
236 sizes and specific surface areas, porosity parameter, pore water chemistry, and finally sorption parameters for specific mineral
237 surfaces. Here, it is highly important to ensure an internal consistency of all combined (sub)models and their parametrization.
238 Additionally, it should be carefully considered whether the parameter range of experimental conditions is including the
239 parameter range required in the applied case. There, any extrapolations may introduce additional errors difficult to estimate.

240 An especially challenging case to be mentioned here is assigning numerical uncertainties to data that are themselves not
241 properly characterized yet (or cannot be in principle). These types of uncertainty sources are usually named and roughly
242 outlined, but none of the information sources provided a concise compilation of uncertainty sources. “Classical” examples for
243 this case are geological variability, microbial activities and future climate development. Here, credit must be given to
244 knowledge casted into estimation methods, or analogies. In many cases, one has to rely on expert’s judgements or guesses (cf.
245 again to NDA report 153 (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2017 and references therein) to obtain the basic data, which
246 in turn renders uncertainty assignments more complicated or even speculative.


247 On the other side it is likely that many uncertainties will diminish throughout the various stages of the repository’s development,
248 construction, operation, closure and post-closure periods. In the course of time, new research results (even from beyond the
249 nuclear community) as well as field characterizations or monitoring will become accessible. In other words, the main reason
250 is probably that people gain more knowledge about the site under planning/construction/operation/closure with time. Here, the
251 safety case, the waste inventory, the design concept, the characteristics of the natural and engineered barriers are to be
252 mentioned. On the other side, it is also expected that, over the very long time spans associated with setting-up RWM, new
253 sources of uncertainties emerge (e.g. due to amendments to the engineering plans, new processes identified in the geosphere,
254 changes of materials). In practice, it is necessary to manage uncertainties throughout the entire process of RWM, with particular
255 attention to all safety aspects.

256 An illustrative example for a complex pattern of processes and related uncertainties for the rather simple sorption process of
257 contaminants onto mineral surfaces is given in Fig. 2. All these subprocesses can be modelled in a mechanistic way, but for
258 the next hierarchy level (reactive transport models) all will melt down to conventional distribution coefficients (K_d values) for
259 each pair of mineral and contaminant. This figure also serves as an example for a Fishbone (Ishikawa) diagram, well suited to
260 show the mutual relationships between parameters and processes; and how uncertainties will be propagated from lower to
261 higher levels of complexity.

262 Such a fishbone diagram is composed of “branches” feeding into the next bigger branch. Each “leaf” on the branches represents
263 an uncertainty component. Each component/leaf can again be the summary of a more detailed uncertainty model that can be



264 sketched by an own Fishbone diagram. This allows applying adequate categorization for each branch of the diagram and avoids
265 having to decide for one unique categorization scheme for all uncertainty sources feeding into the safety case. While using
266 more than one categorization scheme is normally prone to introducing uncertainty sources twice or even multiple times, the
267 Fishbone diagram structure helps to map more clearly uncertainty sources into uncertainty components and to keep the
268 overview of already used components. It provides also a tool for identifying and highlighting branches and leaves, which are
269 especially important for the safety case.



270

271 **Figure 2: Fishbone (Ishikawa) diagram, visualizing the mutual relationship between uncertainties contributing to the**
272 **overall uncertainty of distribution coefficients describing sorption. Entries put in green can be described with**
273 **different (alternative) models. Entries highlighted in yellow point to parameters that are dependent on rock**
274 **heterogeneities, so there uncertainty cannot be reduced.**

275 A second widely used method to describe uncertainties is the usage of respective tables. An example is given in Table 4. It
276 also provides information whether the associated uncertainties are of epistemic or aleatoric type. The first two columns refer
277 to the overall structure of radioactive waste management - as it was developed within the EURAD project and documented in
278 the EURAD Goal Breakdown Structure, see EURAD Consortium, 2021.




279 **Table 4: Uncertainty table describing the hierarchy of contributions to the overall uncertainty associated with the**
 280 **geological and tectonic evolution of a DGR.**

EURAD Subtheme	EURAD Domain	Induced effects	Associated uncertainties	Epistemic / Aleatoric
Long-term stability	Geological and tectonic evolution (Seismicity & Faulting)	changes in hydrogeology (seismic pumping)	frequency; amplitude; time of occurrence	A
		faults growth	fault size	A
		new faults creation --> changes in the water field and transport	fault size and permeability, geometry of aquifers (thickness, depth and extent)	A
		new fractures	hydraulic properties	E

281

282 **2.3. Representative examples for uncertainty interdependencies and origins**

283 When comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, interdependencies between the two levels of complexity and associated parameters become
 284 obvious. The sorption highlighted in Fig. 2 is now a submodel for the radionuclide (RN) migration. Moreover, the pore water
 285 chemistry is also detailed in Fig.2, but within RN migration, it is condensed into one entry. In addition, parameters such as
 286 mineralogy, flow path apertures, or porosities are showing up on different locations.



287

288 **Figure 3: Radionuclide migration: Major uncertainty components and their dependencies.**



289 3. Categorization of uncertainties

290 A categorization can support not only the identification of uncertainties with high relevance for RWM. It will also provide a
291 systematic and uniform approach to describing uncertainties, indicating potential management strategies, and delivering
292 hierarchical structures and mutual dependencies that assist the treatment of uncertainties in systems that are more complex.

293 The reports of PAMINA (Galson and Richardson, 2009), the NEA MeSA Initiative (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2012), and
294 various EURAD documents (Roadmap, deliverables, e.g. reports of Task 3) list and propose a large variety of categorizations
295 of uncertainties. Because the categorization depends on the concept of the numerical model, each report has its own aim-
296 specific categorization. Uncertainty categorization listed in reports include:

- 297 • Parameter, model or scenario uncertainties. A complete description of this categorization can be found in a PAMINA
298 report in the section “Uncertainty Management and Uncertainty Analysis” (Marivoet et al., 2008). Because the
299 uncertainties triggered by different choices of model or scenario are not possible to be quantified a priori, but only a
300 posteriori as a result of extensive modelling efforts, this categorization will not be used for structuring the identified
301 uncertainties in this report.
- 302 • Order of relative magnitude, usually only quantifiable after sensitivity analysis – thus less suitable for a priori
303 assignments. This is in connection to the expected level of knowledge for specific uncertainties during the RWM stages.
304 This does not only refer to the numerical reduction (or increase) of an uncertainty but involves also the development of
305 the mechanistic understanding of the underlying processes and their mutual relationships.
- 306 • Epistemic or aleatory. This categorization is based on the definition given before. In brief, it gives guidance whether or
307 not extensions of parameter determinations (making more experiments, collecting more samples, moving to more
308 sophisticated methods of laboratory or field investigations as well as data processing) could reduce uncertainties or not.
- 309 • Parameter uncertainties applicability in numerical models. This may range from being universally valid to being only
310 valid in a specific safety case. Universally valid parameter uncertainties are for example uncertainties based on
311 thermodynamic models and/or experiments, while parameters uncertainties being only locally valid are for example
312 associated with characteristics of a specific host rock or a certain type of radioactive waste container. This categorization
313 helps to assess to what extent the parameter and its uncertainty can be transferred between models for different safety
314 cases in Europe.
- 315 • Relevance for RWM. This is to be evaluated at European level (thus giving preference to those uncertainties that are of
316 interest in several EU member states). Further iteration cycles of the EURAD Roadmap may be helpful in this direction.
- 317 • Management option: Uncertainties can be distinguished with regard to their treatment in later stages of the safety case
318 development and their application in issuing recommendations and decision supports. Obviously, it is neither required
319 nor feasible to eliminate all uncertainties, as often even a drastic reduction is not possible. Available options are
320 reduction, mitigation or avoidance; see e.g. (Bailey, 2005) for a more detailed discussion. In the case of reduction,
321 usually more detailed field characterizations or lab experiments are required, where the efforts should scale with the



- 322 importance and strategic significance of the respective parameter. Mitigating involves addressing the uncertainty
323 explicitly, for example through the use of probabilistic techniques, bounding the uncertainty and showing that even the
324 bounding case gives acceptable safety, introducing redundancies in technical systems, or switching to design strategies
325 and techniques that are less vulnerable. The possibility of ignoring an uncertainty may be considered in two ways:
326 Firstly, it may be demonstrated that the uncertainty in question is not a significant factor in terms of safety. Secondly,
327 it may be ruled out based on the associated FEP, which may be either very unlikely or eliminated through design; see
328 e.g. McManus and Hasting, 2004, for further reading.
- 329 • Type of heterogeneity with regard to space or time. This mainly affects the conceptualisation and modelling of natural
330 systems, because of the inherent variability of the natural systems and their evolution over time often lead to high
331 uncertainties. The natural systems include the geological host rock, regional geology, hydrology, biosphere, especially
332 of the critical zone, and climate. To a lesser extent, it also concerns the components of the geotechnical barrier. In the
333 worst case, representativeness of local characterizations may even be questionable at all.
 - 334 • Temporal order of occurrence, according to successive development stages of the disposal program. Here, guidance is
335 provided by the following sequence of phases, which was taken from the EURAD Roadmap Theme Overview:
 - 336 - Program initiation
 - 337 - Site evaluation and selection
 - 338 - Site characterization
 - 339 - Construction
 - 340 - Operation and closure
 - 341 • Occurrence by system, e.g. container, geosphere, biosphere, climate, human actions. Here, system can mean both
342 components and (a group of) phenomena. Here, the Themes defined by the Goal Breakdown Structure (GBS) currently
343 developed within the EURAD Roadmap (again as of June 30, 2020) are helpful. They are very similar to the ones
344 officially distributed through the 1st Roadmap version (EURAD Consortium, 2018). As they are now further divided
345 into 25 Subthemes totally (comprising of even more Domains), another level of detailed categorization is thus provided.
346 It must be mentioned here, however, that these Themes are established as a blend of component, phenomena and
347 chronology paradigms.
 - 348 - National Programme Management
 - 349 - Predisposal
 - 350 - Engineered Barrier System (EBS)
 - 351 - Geoscience
 - 352 - Design and Optimisation
 - 353 - Siting and Licensing
 - 354 - Safety Case



355 One should mention that a similar categorization could be derived when building on FEP categories.

356 Already at an early stage of the UMAN project, the latter entry was chosen to categorize uncertainties according to the
357 occurrence by system phenomena, following the themes and subthemes of the EURAD GBS. Also all other EURAD
358 documents follow that approach, i.e. respective information is already pre-categorized.

359 **4. How to assign numerical values to uncertainties – and what to do if this seems impossible ...**

360 The last part of this paper points to the evaluation as well as quantification of uncertainties. This step is far from trivial due to
361 several reasons outlines below:

- 362 • Incomplete or totally missing information, with reasons being, e.g., too large efforts for experimental studies or filed
363 explorations, lacking access in principle to some parameters
- 364 • Imprecise data due to non-ideal experiments / field studies: method, device, boundary conditions etc.
- 365 • Inherent heterogeneities (in space and/or time), i.e. variability of the geological situations with respect to anisotropy
366 and layering. This relates to mineralogical composition, grain sizes, mineral surfaces potentially exposed to water, weak
367 zones, flow path patterns etc.

368 One can sketch three levels of uncertainty evaluation:

- 369 1. Experimental stage: Specifically designed experiments allow to determine and quantify uncertainties of single
370 uncertainty components. Here, if resources allow and demand is high enough, replications of these experiments may
371 help to narrow down error bars.
- 372 2. Uncertainty model: Conceptual models are transformed into process models making use of the uncertainties above
373 determined.
- 374 3. Mathematical theory: Deterministic/probability statistics, worst-case analysis and fuzzy set theory.

375 The mathematical theory behind the proper treatment of uncertainties is not the topic of this report, so only a few remarks are
376 presented here; the interested reader is referred to special literature instead. At least in the context of RW it became obvious,
377 that most reports and experts use probability statistics. Two main branches are frequency statistics and Bayesian statistics. A
378 frequently used mathematical tool to characterize the value range and the likelihood are probability density functions (pdf).
379 Alternative approaches are Worst-case analysis and Fuzzy set theory. The latter is especially useful when encountering the
380 Challenge of a transfer of verbal descriptions of uncertainties (cf. low/high, all/many/some/few/no, above/below) into
381 numerical approaches.



382 **5. Outlook: What are the gaps in understanding, quantification and processing of uncertainties?**

383 The terms “relevance/importance” and associated criteria for them with respect to the various topics require a more intensive
384 discussion. A thorough survey in other EURAD deliverables issued so far is recommended for indicators that may help to rank
385 the importance of FEPs and their associated uncertainty.

386 A more detailed look on the temporal order of occurrences of uncertainties is helpful, i.e. which uncertainty has its source in
387 which stage of the disposal site development, in which stage will the consequences materialize? This essentially concerns the
388 difference in time when an uncertainty becomes “active” and when it has to be considered. For example, uncertainties occurring
389 in RWM stage 5 (Design and Optimisation) must be already known in stages 2 (Pre-disposal) and 3 (Engineered Barrier
390 Systems). A revision of ranking and order of various uncertainties might also be necessary for the current EURAD Themes
391 definition, where, e.g., the evaluation and selection of a site still comes before its characterization.

392 An important point raised in the answers to the common Subtasks 2.2/2.3 questionnaire was how to reduce uncertainties due
393 to poor communication between “applied” persons (field expert, lab expert, etc.) and “geeks” (safety assessor, modeller, etc.).
394 Respective guidelines for cooperation should be developed, probably best placed in one of the Task 3 deliverables. Such
395 guidelines have to address:

- 396 • when to communicate techniques of measurement with their advantages and limits,
397 • when and how to communicate the objective and the kind of safety calculations that are intended to be performed,
398 • how knowledge can be translated so that everyone understands which applied action feeds in at which stage of the
399 modelling and vice versa,
400 • which clear reporting standards must be developed.

401 The issue of uncertainty correlation requires further investigation. Dependencies between input parameters and consequently
402 between their uncertainties are rather the rule than the exception in complex systems. Sensitivity analyses may even reveal
403 correlations that have previously been overlooked in complex systems, pointing to incomplete or oversimplified models.
404 Failure to account for these correlations often exaggerates the effects of uncertainty on the target function, i.e. the risk.
405 However, a proper treatment is hardly to find in RWM at all, most probably due to its complicated numerical structure. The
406 two major approaches for addressing this issue are to either add correlation coefficients or to re-parameterize the (sub)model
407 to avoid interdependencies.

408 The transition from geosphere models to biosphere models is also important from an uncertainty point of view but has not
409 been much addressed in RWM. Here, representatives from the radioecology community may be a helpful extension.

410 It is certainly a challenge to convince modellers and programmers to develop and implement / extend codes that will them
411 enable to:

- 412 • make directly use of uncertainties based on pdfs or other representations (on-line),



413 • combine uncertainty components in a model other than additive; because using additive uncertainty propagation only
414 would lead to unrealistic cases (see annotation to correlation above).

415 There are several topics, such as long-term effects (e.g. future climate changes and the induced effects on host rock and
416 ecosphere) or structural geology in combination with geochemistry and geostatistics, where the theoretical background is not
417 well developed yet with respect to uncertainties. Here, more research that is fundamental is definitely necessary.

418 Finally, further research activities should elaborate possible ways to treat uncertainties resulting from human behaviour
419 numerically, taking into account that their impact on the safety could be significant.

420 **6. Summary & Conclusion**

421 A workflow recommended for treating uncertainties in RWM shall include the following major steps, with much more
422 background information to be extracted from the bibliography appended here (and secondary references therein):

- 423 • Identify all FEPs (features/events/processes)
- 424 • Assign importance to the FEPs
- 425 • Assign models to each such FEP
- 426 • Check available parameterization
- 427 • Assign uncertainties to these parameters
- 428 • Categorize uncertainties to ease further processing
- 429 • Convert information into numerics if necessary and possible, e.g. by applying fuzzy theory
- 430 • Derive pdfs
- 431 • Define appropriate target function(s)
- 432 • Apply uncertainty and sensitivity analysis
- 433 • Re-iterate on importance
- 434 • Start management of uncertainties, e.g. by model reduction, avoiding or mitigating uncertainties (cf. EURAD
435 Deliverable D10.2 “Strategies for managing uncertainties” of the UMAN WP, Hicks et al., 2023)

436 A number of open questions have been identified that deserve further actions (research, compilation, evaluation, application):

- 437 • “Relevance/Importance” and associated criteria for them with respect to the various topics require a more intensive
438 discussion
- 439 • Have a more detailed look on the temporal order of occurrences of uncertainties
- 440 • Reduce uncertainties due to poor communication between “applied” persons (field expert, lab expert, etc.) and “geeks”
441 (safety assessor, modeller, etc.)
- 442 • Better connect transition from geosphere models to biosphere models
- 443 • Investigate the issue of uncertainty correlation



444 • Extend codes to make directly use of uncertainties and combine uncertainty components in a model other than additive

445 ***Uncertainty is a certainty – embrace it because you cannot escape it!***

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495 **Glossary**

496 Aleatory Uncertainty: The stochastic part of the uncertainty of an input parameter that forms an intrinsic property of the
497 parameter and that cannot be reduced. An aleatory random variable represents the possible outcome of an observation of the
498 quantity.



499 Epistemic Uncertainty: The part of the uncertainty of an input parameter resulting from limited knowledge of the natural
500 conditions and processes that can in principle be reduced by obtaining more information. An epistemic random variable
501 represents the state of knowledge about the quantity.

502 Features, Events, and Processes (FEP): These are terms used in the fields of radioactive waste management, carbon capture
503 and storage, and hydraulic fracturing to define relevant scenarios for safety assessment studies.

504 Geological Domain: A spatial distinct region or subregion in the geological formation with similar modal mineral composition,
505 structural properties, spatial orientation and anisotropy, rock density, porosity and rock mechanic properties.

506 Goal Breakdown Structure (GBS): The EURAD goals breakdown structure is a thematic breakdown of knowledge and generic
507 activities essential for radioactive waste management. It comprises Themes (Level 1), Subthemes (Level 2) and Domains
508 (Level 3), each formulated as goals. Although hierarchical and numbered, the knowledge and activities presented across the
509 GBS should be considered collectively with no weighting to order of importance. Rather it is emphasised that there are many
510 inter-dependencies and linked data across the GBS, where knowledge and activities can be centred in different ways, depending
511 on the end user role and precise boundary conditions of a specific RWM programme.

512 Sensitivity Analysis (SA): The process of appreciating the dependency of the model output from model input. It also
513 investigates how important each model input is in determining the output.

514 Uncertainty: A lack of objective information (evidence) or subjective information (knowledge).

515 Uncertainty Analysis (UA): The process of exploring the uncertainty in the model output.

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525 review and editing.



526 **Competing interests:**

527 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

528 **Short summary:**

529 Decisions associated with radioactive waste management are made in the presence of irreducible and reducible uncertainties.
530 Here, the identification of such uncertainties (namely numerical ones), their ranking according to relevance, their
531 categorization, the elucidation of internal dependencies and cross-interactions is addressed. Suitable methodologies to analyse
532 and illustrate complex uncertainty patterns are discussed.